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Confucius Institutes and the 
University: Distinguishing the  
Political Mission from the Cultural
CHRISTOPHER R. HUGHES
The rapid spread of Confucius Institutes (CI) around the world has 
received growing attention from both critics and admirers.  The former 
question whether it is right for organizations funded and governed by the 
Chinese state to operate on campuses in liberal-democratic societies; the 
latter claim that the CIs contribute to the general good by facilitating the 
teaching of the Chinese language and enhancing academic exchange.  
This paper will scrutinize the role of the Confucius Institute by debating 
over the missions of the university and the institute itself.  A careful look at  
the organizational links between the institutes and the CCP will be provided.   
This paper argues that the clash of missions may be seen as risks by aca- 
demic staff and students in host institutions; they are merely the conse-
quences of the CIs fulfilling the mission with which they have been entrusted.
KEYWORDS:  Confucius Institute; Hanban; CCP; political mission; cul- 
tural mission.
*   *   *
After China started to establish Confucius Institutes (CIs) around 
the world in 2004, a first wave of academic analysis appeared 
that was far from conclusive in deciding whether this was a 
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welcome development.  Some observers raised concerns over the implica-
tions for academic freedom of having organizations funded and governed 
by the Chinese state operating on campuses in democratic societies.1 
Others found little evidence that they were engaged in political ac- 
tivity beyond the kind of cultural diplomacy that is legitimately pursued 
by many governments.2  Since then, the debate on whether the CI’s are 
compatible with the core mission of the university in a democratic soci-
ety has continued to intensify, especially since the publication of a harsh 
critique by the distinguished University of Chicago anthropologist, Mar-
shall Sahlins, in October 2013.3
Little of this discussion, however, has explored how the spread of 
the CIs has been encouraged by changes in the nature of higher educa-
tion that are driven by factors such as the shifting of funding away from 
government spending and the need to bolster the social legitimacy of 
universities by providing policy relevant research and employment fo-
cused training.  For the first time in history, however, these developments 
are providing the context within which a one-party state is able to use its 
growing economic capabilities to influence the work of universities in 
democratic societies found in North America, Europe, Australasia, Japan 
and India.4  It is important to bear this in mind when assessing the impact 
of the CIs, because if the university is understood to be one of the most 
1Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contem-
porary China (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 165.
2Falk Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” Journal of Chinese Political 
Science 17, no. 1 (2012): 53-76; James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: 
The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, no. 
4, (2009): 647-69.
3Marshall Sahlins, “China U.,” The Nation, October 29, 2013, http://www.thenation.com/
article/176888/china-u#; For a rejoinder, see Edward A. McCord, “Confucius Institute: 
Hardly a Threat to Academic Freedoms,” The Diplomat, March 27, 2014, http://thediplomat 
.com/2014/03/confucius-institutes-hardly-a-threat-to-academic-freedoms/; for a broad 
range of perspectives triggered by the growing dispute see also Perry Link, “The Debate Over 
Confucius Institutes,” ChinaFile, June 23, 2014, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/
debate-over-confucius-institutes (accessed October 3, 2014).
4For the purposes of this discussion a “democratic” society can be taken to mean a society 
that allows more than one party to engage in free and fair elections and places a high value 
on the freedom of expression and association and the rule of law.
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important institutions shaping the values of a democratic society, its status 
as an independent source of critical knowledge is important not only for 
education but also for the healthy development of democracy itself.
This article will thus attempt a reassessment of the debate over the 
CIs by setting the basic positions in the early literature in the context of a 
brief discussion of the changing nature of the university itself.  It will then 
present the available information concerning the mission of the CIs and 
their relationship to the Chinese Party-State.  This will be followed by an 
account of the risks that are involved in the hosting of CIs.  Finally, an as-
sessment of the ability of universities to manage such risks will be made 
in light of the latest developments.  In the process, it is particularly im-
portant to look at how incidents that have occurred with the CIs in recent 
years allow us to begin to move beyond Paradise’s conclusion in 2009 
that “only time will tell whether the Confucius Institutes can help spark 
a more sympathetic understanding of China and usher in a more benign 
view of it.”5
The Mission of the University
Very little was said about the changing mission of the university in 
the first wave of literature on the impact of the CIs.  Paradise’s ground-
breaking article in 2009, for example, is primarily concerned with whether 
the CIs are effective tools for the promotion of a positive international im-
age for China.  Hartig’s 2012 account of the operation of CIs in Germany 
also largely focuses on asking whether they are engaged in the same kind 
of cultural diplomacy as organizations sponsored by democratic states, 
such as the Goethe Institutes or the British Council.6  Although Starr looks 
at the impact of CIs on education, he is mainly concerned with pedagogi-
cal issues, such as the political implications of the exclusion of traditional 
5Paradise, “China and International Harmony,” 664.
6Hartig, “Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China.”
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characters and dialects from their curriculum,7 rather than the evolution of 
the broader mission of the university.
When assessing the impact of the CIs, however, it is important not 
to assume that the mission of the university is unchanging.  It has under-
gone constant change since World War Two, since, like all institutions 
in democratic countries, the authority of the university to determine its 
own purpose has been challenged by a series of crises.  Events like the 
Vietnam War and the rise of the “counter-culture” movement, combined 
with new social demands such as the call to give minorities greater access 
and accommodate their interests in curriculum changes, the need to solve 
domestic problems related to issues such as the environment, health and 
housing, and the need to supply personnel equipped to work in a post-
industrial society have all had an impact.  In 1970, the sociologist Dan-
iel Bell (not to be confused with the eponymous advocate of Confucian 
meritocracy currently based at Tsinghua University in Beijing) provided 
a useful way of conceptualizing this dynamic process by proposing that 
the values of the university could be understood as defined by a tension 
between what he called “classical” and “pragmatic” models.  The former 
was rooted in the origins of the university as an organization entrusted by 
society to pursue the truth and evaluate culture though a theoretical ques-
tioning of anything and everything.  The latter sees the role of the univer-
sity as being primarily to serve society through training large numbers of 
people, the application of knowledge and providing personnel to serve in 
government and elsewhere.8
Although much has changed in society and the university since the 
days of the anti-Vietnam War movement, Bell’s categories still stand as a 
useful starting point for understanding the origins of the debate over the 
mission of the university today.  This is because much of the discussion 
of the mission of the university in the subsequent decades can be seen as 
7Don Starr, “Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes,” European 
Journal of Education 44, no. 1 (2009): 65-82.
8Daniel Bell, “Quo Warranto?—Notes on the Governance of Universities in the 1970s,” 
National Affairs, no. 19 (Spring 1970): 63.
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the search for an optimal balance between his two models.  Some have 
decried the decline of the university as an institution defined by nothing 
more than the mission to pursue knowledge for its own sake.9  More mod-
erate voices accept the need to meet pragmatic demands but still argue 
that the university must never forget that it also has a role in protecting 
and promoting the humanistic conception of the individual as a citizen, 
which makes the university “intrinsically related to the extension of de-
mocracy. . . .”10  Most academics would agree with the view put forward 
by Craig Calhoun and Diana Rhoten that while it is right for the university 
to be engaged in the practical affairs of society, it should also maintain a 
public mission of cultivating citizenship and advances in civil society, as 
well as presenting scientific inquiry and debate as a model for the kind of 
behavior citizens need to practice for democracy to work.11
Maintaining the classical model has become increasingly hard as the 
growing demands on universities have been combined with diminishing 
financial support from the state.  At the same time, the rise of neo-liberal 
economics and the greater ease of travel and communication leave univer-
sities competing for students and prestige in an international market.  The 
global financial crisis in 2008 only added to the pressure, as institutions 
have seen diminishing returns from alternative sources of income, such 
as endowments.  A raft of reforms to higher education introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 2010, for example, dramatically raised tuition fees 
and removed government funding for teaching the arts, humanities and 
social sciences.  The result of such global trends is the emergence of the 
“enterprise university,” in which decision-making is increasingly central-
ized at the expense of governance procedures that were put in place to 
  9Kenneth Minogue, The Concept of a University (1973; repr., New Brunswick and London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2009).
10Thomas Docherty, For the University: Democracy and the Future of the Institution (London 
and New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), Kindle Loc. 577.
11Craig Calhoun, “The Public Mission of the Research University,” in Knowledge Matters: 
The Public Mission of the Research University, ed. Diana Rhoten and Craig Calhoun 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), Kindle Loc. 539; Diana Rhoten and Craig 
Calhoun, “Preface,” in Knowledge Matters, Kindle Loc. 274.
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preserve the values at the heart of the classical model, in order to meet 
targets set by governments and achieve status in league tables.12
Despite these radical changes, however, when the literature on the 
changing mission of the university broadens its focus to the international 
context, it remains rooted in an age when the major question was whether 
developing countries would follow the model set by the advanced indus-
trialized democracies.  As developing societies became richer, it was ex-
pected that they would follow the model of allowing their institutions to 
unite freedom of intellectual inquiry with the creation of new knowledge 
through research, the nurturing of a scholarly community, open public 
communication and efforts to make knowledge widely available as a pub-
lic good.13  With China on track to become the world’s biggest economy 
by the middle of this century, putting its government in an increasingly 
strong position to shape social values in democratic societies through their 
universities, such a perspective is rather anachronistic.
By 2008, the complex dilemmas that this power shift presents for 
academic institutions had already begun to emerge through episodes such 
as the claim made by the China Daily that the vice-chancellor of London 
Metropolitan University had sent a letter of apology to China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, after a report appeared in the Chinese press that mi-
gration agents and students were threatening to boycott his institution for 
awarding an honorary doctorate to the Dalai Lama.14  The university itself 
claimed that no letter had been sent and that its vice-chancellor had only 
“expressed regret at any unhappiness that had been caused to Chinese 
people” by the award of the honorary degree to the Dalai Lama in a meet-
12Simon Marginson and Mark Considine, The Enterprise University: Power, Governance 
and Reinvention in Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jan Currie 
and Janice Newson, Universities and Globalisation: Critical Perspectives (London: Sage 
Publications, 1998); Jan Currie et al., Globalizing Practices and University Responses: 
European and Anglo-American Differences (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).
13Calhoun, “The Public Mission,” Kindle Loc. 313.
14“Duo jia liuxue zhongjie biaoshi dizhi ting ‘Zang du’ Yingguo gaoxiao” (Several overseas 
study agencies say they will boycott the British university that supports “Tibetan inde-
pendence”), Huanqiu shibao (Global Times), June 13, 2008, http://world.people.com.cn/
GB/57506/7380085.html (accessed February 18, 2013).
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ing with staff from the Chinese embassy.15  Whatever form the univer-
sity’s response took, though, a member of the embassy staff was reported 
to have demanded that the university should refuse speaking platforms 
to Tibetan independence groups if it wanted the relationship to return to 
normal.16  Yet commentators like Hartig and Paradise do not look at the 
implications of this shifting context for the long-term impact of CIs, even 
though the Chinese government aims to establish 1,000 around the world 
by 2020, a target that has already been half-met in 2014.
With CIs in the United States being offered volunteer teachers and 
USD150,000 as startup funds from the Hanban and “provide a set amount 
of annual fund [sic] according to needs,”17  the attractions for cash-
strapped universities seem strong, even if they are expected to provide 
matching funds and local laws often mean that Chinese staff have to be 
paid at standard rates.18  Many of the first assessments of the CIs, how-
ever, did not see such a relationship with the Chinese state as problematic 
because they tended to equate the new organizations with institutions 
such as the British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institutes.19  Such san-
guine appraisals, however, do not stand up to scrutiny when attention is 
paid to the way in which the work of the CIs is tied to the interests of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), an organization that promotes the ide-
als of a one-party system and adopts policies that are seen by many inside 
and outside China as not only detrimental to many individuals and social 
groups but also as incompatible with the democratic aspects of the classi-
cal model of the university.  To test this point, it is worth looking again at 
15“‘Regret at Unhappiness’ over Dalai Lama’s Degree,” Times Higher Education, July 9, 2008, 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/regret-at-unhappiness-over-dalai-lamas 
-degree/402720.article.
16Xiang Li, “London School Regrets Honoring Dalai Lama,” China Daily, August 7, 2008, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-07/08/content_6826398.htm.
17“Agreement Between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and [country and institu-
tion name] on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at [institution name].”
18Peter Schmidt, “At US Colleges, Chinese-Financed Centers Prompt Worries About Aca-
demic Freedom,” Chronicle of Higher Education, October 22, 2010, http://chronicle 
.texterity.com/chronicle/20101022a?pg=8#pg8.
19Hartig,“Confucius Institutes and the Rise of China,” 68-69.
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the available information concerning how the mission of the CIs is shaped 
by the Chinese Party-State.
The Mission of the CIs
The Confucius Institute Headquarters in Beijing, commonly known 
as the “Hanban,” presents its mission in terms that appeal to both the 
classical and the pragmatic models of the university, being “committed to 
providing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services 
worldwide, it goes all out in meeting the demands of foreign Chinese 
learners and contributing to the development of multiculturalism and the 
building of a harmonious world.”20  The template contract that the Hanban 
uses to agree partnerships with universities also declares that the purpose 
of the CIs is to “strengthen educational cooperation between China and 
[the host country], support and promote the development of Chinese lan-
guage education, and increase mutual understanding among people in 
China and in [the host country].” Article 4 of the contract establishes the 
scope of CI activities in more detail as:
1. Teaching Chinese language and providing Chinese language 
teaching resources.
2. Training Chinese language instructors.
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and 
tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers.
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China’s 
education, culture, and so forth.
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities.
6. Other activities with authorization and by appointment of the 
Headquarters.21
20“About Us,” Hanban website, http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm (accessed Febru-
ary 13, 2013).
21“Agreement Between Confucius Institute Headquarters of China and [country and institu-
tion name] on the Establishment of Confucius Institute at [institution name].”
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This stress on the pragmatic aspects of language training and inter-
national cooperation is certainly attractive to many universities around 
the world, which are grateful for the provision of language teachers in 
particular.  Yet the political system in China is built on an understanding 
of the relationship between culture and politics that is very different from 
that found in the democracies that sponsor organizations such as the British 
Council.  This has its origins in a long CCP tradition that still refers to 
the series of lectures on culture given by Mao Zedong (毛澤東) in the 
CCP base area of Yan’an in May 1942, in which he instructs an audience 
of artists, musicians and writers to understand that “There is in fact no 
such thing as art for art’s sake, art that stands above classes or art that is 
detached from or independent of politics.”  According to Mao, the task of 
cultural policy is to form a “cultural army” that is “absolutely indispens-
able for uniting our own ranks and defeating the enemy.”22  Although 
Mao’s speech was delivered in the very different context of the war 
against the Japanese and political struggles against opponents in the CCP 
and the Guomindang Nationalists, it is still celebrated on its anniversary 
down to today.  If anything, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the spirit 
of Yan’an has been strengthened, as indicated by his speech to the Beijing 
Forum on Literature and Art Work in October 2014, in which he reminds 
his audience that “serving Socialism” is the fundamental orientation of 
the arts, which should combine socialist ideology with Chinese tradition 
in order to “implement the Party’s literature and art principles and policies 
well, and grasp the correct orientation of literature and art development.”23 
The persistence of this linkage between culture and the interests of the 
CCP in foreign relations is evident in the expectation that cultural produc-
22Mao Zedong, “Talks at the Yenan (sic.) Forum on Literature and Art,” http://www.marxists 
.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_08.htm (accessed February 
13, 2013).
23A summary was published by the Xinhua news agency and the original text of the speech 
was not published.  An English version can be found online at “Xi Jinping’s Talk at the Be-
jing Forum on Literature and Art,” China Copyright and Media, October 16, 2014, http://
chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/16/xi-jinpings-talks-at-the-beijing 
-forum-on-literature-and-art/.
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tions made for export should convey a positive view of modern China and 
in pressure on the foreign organizers of overseas events not to allow ac-
tivities that are deemed to be a source of possible embarrassment.24  In the 
process, criticisms of the CCP and its policies are erased.
While the more modern idea of public diplomacy has been very 
attractive in China in recent years, it is still shaped by the norm of see-
ing culture as a tool for the preservation and promotion of CCP power. 
That the CIs are no exception to this instrumentalism was evident when 
Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, 
proclaimed to the Hanban in April 2007 that the CIs are “an important 
part of China’s international popularization (xuanchuan).”25  How such 
a statement is understood by a foreign audience depends largely on what 
is meant by the Chinese term “xuanchuan” 宣傳, rendered by interna-
tional news organizations such as The Economist as “propaganda” when 
translating Li’s speech.26  In recent years, however, this term has been 
rendered into English as “publicity,” a practice that is adopted by Para-
dise.  More recently, in a response to the critique of the CIs by Sahlins, 
Edward A.  McCord, an eminent professor of modern Chinese military 
history at George Washington University, has argued that xuanchuan has 
no negative connotations because it is similar to the use of “propaganda” 
by the Catholic church.  When Li’s speech is understood in this context, 
he maintains, it is merely defining the role of the CIs in “more limited soft 
power terms.”27
Of course, equating xuanchuan with Vatican propaganda is itself 
problematic for advocates of academic freedom, given the long struggle 
24Sheila Melvin, “Commemorating Mao’s Yan’an Talks,” ArtsJournal Blogs, May 15, 2012, 
http://www.artsjournal.com/china/2012/05/commemorating-maos-yanan-talks/ (accessed 
February 21, 2013).
25“Li Changchun: Zhashi zuohao hanyu guoji tuiguang gongzuo” (Li Changchun: Work 
Well to Internationalize the Chinese Language), Xinhuanet, April 24, 2007, http://news 
.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-04/24/content_6022792.htm.
26“A Message from Confucius: New Ways of Projecting Soft Power,” The Economist, Oc-
tober 22, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14678507.
27McCord, “Confucius Institute.”
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between science and the Church.  Moreover, it is rather misleading for 
McCord to equate xuanchuan with soft power terms in this way be-
cause the CIs are so closely tied to the program of a particular political 
party.  There is no secret about this in CCP documents, its Central Com-
mittee even passing a key resolution on promoting the development of 
“socialist culture” at its plenary session in October 2011, in which CIs 
were described (along with the Xinhua News Agency and China Central 
Television) as part of the drive to “create new methods of xuanchuan to 
strengthen our international right to speak, respond to foreign concerns, 
improve international society’s understanding of our basic national con-
ditions, concepts of values, road of development, domestic and foreign 
policies, to display our country’s image of civilization, openness and 
progress.”28
The way in which this cultural policy is designed to promote the 
CCP vision of a China characterized by “socialist culture” also makes it 
misleading to equate what the CIs do with the notion of building “soft 
power.”  The inventor of this concept, Joseph Nye of Harvard Univer-
sity, distinguishes it from state power, seeing it as an attractive force that 
emerges from grass roots social and economic activity.  He has explicitly 
cited CIs as an example of the misguided belief that government is its 
main instrument.29  When interacting with foreign commentators, more-
over, Chinese interlocutors thus shy away from acknowledging this link 
28“Chuangxin duiwai xuanchuan fangshi fangfa, zengqiang guoji huayu quan, tuoshan hui-
ying waibu guanqie, zengjin guoji shehui dui wo guo jiben quoqing, jiazhi guannian, fa-
zhan daolu, nei wai zhengce de liaojie he renshi, zhanxian wo guo wenming, minzhu, kai-
fang, jinbu xingxiang” (創新對外宣傳方式方法，增強國際話語權，妥善回應外部關
切，增進國際社會對我國基本國情、價值觀念、發展道路、內外政策的了解和認
識，展現我國文明、民主、開放、進步的形象), Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), “Shouquan fabu: 
Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shenhua wenhua tizhi gaige tuidong shehuizhuyi wenhua 
da fazhan da fanrong ruogan da wenti de jueding” (Official proclamation: Resolution of 
the central committee of the CCP on some big broblems related to deepening reform of 
the cultural system to promote the great flourishing of socialist civilization), Xinhuanet, 
October 26, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-10/25/c_122197737_7.htm.
29Joseph S. Nye, “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 
April 29, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia 
_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0.
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between the CIs and the interests of the Party-State.  Paradise, for example, 
describes how a university administrator he interviewed in Shanghai stated 
that it is “misleading” to think that CIs have anything to do with soft 
power, leading him to propose there is a division between academics and 
a political elite that does believe in the importance of soft power.30  Yet 
even the most cursory survey of writing about CIs in Chinese academic 
journals shows that there is no hesitation in presenting them as tools for 
the enhancement of the “soft power” needed to advance the CCP’s “go 
global” economic policy and turn China into a major world power.31  Chi-
nese academics note approvingly that the building of soft power is a target 
in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for the economy (2011-2015).32
The Difference Between CIs and Other Institutions for  
Cultural Diplomacy
This use of culture to promote the political programs of a particular 
party shows that it is quite wrong to equate CIs with cultural diplomacy 
organizations established by democratic states.  Even if it is accepted that 
organizations like the British Council and Goethe Institutes use culture to 
30Paradise, “China and International Harmony,” 657.
31For a sample to show how articles on CIs in Chinese academic journals cite Nye’s con-
cept of “soft power” as the inspiration for the CIs, see Wang Shuaidong, “Guanyu Zhong-
guo wenhua duiwai chuanbo xinxing celue zhi ‘Kongzi xueyuan da chun wan’ de sikao” 
(Thoughts on the “Confucius Institute Grand New Year Evening” and the new strategy 
for spreading Chinese culture abroad), Jiaoyu jiaoxue luntan (Education Teaching Forum) 
(Hebei), no. 39 (2012): 79; Liu Xiaoli, Li Hui, and Gui Ling, “Shijie qita yuyan wenhua 
tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi dui Kongzi xueyuan ke chixu fazhan de qishi” (Lessons for 
the consistent development of the Confucius Institutes from the mode of development of 
other organizations in the world for promoting language and culture), Changjiang xueshu 
(Yangtze River Academic) 3, no. 22 (2012): 122; Zhou Yun, “Cong guoji xingxiang shijiao 
kan Kongzi xueyuan zai Meiguo yuyan chuanbo de fazhan” (Looking at the develop-
ment of language transmission of the Confucius Institutes in the United States from the 
perspective of international image), Yunnan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao (The Journal of 
Yunnan Administration College) (Yunnan), no. 6 (2012): 162.
32Ding Zhongyi and Wei Xing, “Kongzi xueyuan: Zhongguo ruan shili jianshe de youxiao 
pingtai” (Confucius Institutes: An effective platform for establishing China’s soft power), 
Lilun yu gaige (Theory and Reform), no. 5 (2011): 122-25.
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promote certain political values, the question of which values are being 
promoted by the CIs is what is important for universities in democratic 
societies.  If guarding and cultivating ideals that are seen as necessary for 
democracy to work, such as freedom of thought and expression, models 
of citizenship, and advances in civil society, are critical, it is inappropri-
ate for them to host and lend legitimacy to organizations that promote the 
values of China’s one-party state, even when these are presented as “pub-
licity” for China’s “national conditions.” On this point, it is important to 
stress that there is a big difference between organizing a conference with 
a Chinese university or working with academic colleagues from China on 
the one hand, and allowing an institution that has the mission of promot-
ing the values and interests of the CCP to have a long-term base on cam-
pus and to share in the prestige of the university by having a page on its 
website and use of its logo, on the other.
In contrast to this kind of arrangement, an organization like the Brit-
ish Council goes to great lengths to ensure that it is not tied to any party 
political interests.  Although it receives a government grant and presents 
an annual report on its objectives and programs to the Secretary of State 
and Parliament, it is established as a public corporation with a charter that 
ensures that it is free from direct political interference by the government, 
the state or political parties.  Its executive board and board of trustees are 
composed of figures drawn either from the Council itself, or more broadly 
from the worlds of the arts, business and commerce.  The only govern-
ment representation is in the form of a member of the board of trustees 
who is an employee of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  When 
the Council’s work can be described as having a political agenda, such as 
its mission to promote social change and voice and accountability for all 
by encouraging the institutional development of justice, the rule of law, 
civil society and economic development, this is openly stated on its web-
site.33  More importantly, this does not present a problem for universities 
33British Council website, http://www.britishcouncil.org/governance-work-2.htm (accessed 
February 21, 2013).
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in countries where the Council operates because branches of the British 
Council are not located on campuses but in premises paid for by the 
Council itself.34
The CIs, on the other hand, are located on university campuses, are 
closely linked to the Chinese Party-State and have a political program 
that is openly discussed in China but not mentioned on their website or 
contracts.  The contract signed between the Hanban and the host univer-
sity, and the Constitution of the Confucius Institutes, moreover, give the 
Hanban a large degree of control.  It goes so far as to state that CI activi-
ties “shall not contravene concerning (sic) the laws and regulations of 
China.”35  There are two reasons why such a wide-ranging clause should 
give rise to concern.  First of all, it constrains the freedom of the CIs to 
offer a balanced view of some of the issues of most interest to a foreign 
audience.  The Anti-Secession Law, for example, makes it illegal to advo-
cate the independence of Taiwan.  Linked to this, these terms oblige the 
Hanban to filter out prospective personnel who might have been involved 
in activities such as organizing independent trade unions, joining certain 
religious groups and promoting democracy and human rights, all of which 
have been reasons to imprison individuals and proscribe organizations in 
China.  The combination of these factors is what lies behind an embar-
rassing event like the application for asylum filed by a teacher posted to 
the CI at McMaster University in Canada, on the grounds that she found 
herself in the position of either having to hide her membership of Falun 
Gong in order to work at the university, or incriminate herself by refus-
ing to sign.  Yet if there is any disagreement with the host institution over 
what activities a CI is permitted to undertake, the bylaws of the Confucius 
34Germany’s Goethe Institutes have a slightly different model insofar as they do have a 
small number of offices in language colleges in China, but not in research universities. 
Li Xiangping, “Kongzi xueyuan yu Gede xueyuan bijiao yanjiu” (Comparative research 
on the Confucius Institutes and the Goethe Institutes), Dangdai jiaoyu lilun yu shijian 
(Theory and Practice of Contemporary Education), no. 11 (2012): 27-31.
35“Constitution of the Confucius Institutes,” August, 29, 2009, Chapter 1 Article 6.  Available 
online at Confucius Institute Online, http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/
content_22323.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).
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Institutes place the power of assessment and adjudication in the hands of 
the Hanban.  The Hanban is even given the power to impose a range of 
sanctions, from terminating agreements to pursuing legal action to affix 
responsibility and to invoke punitive consequences on any person or party 
who engages in “any activity conducted under the name of the Confucius 
Institutes without permission or authorization from the Confucius Institute 
Headquarters.”36
In addition to this, the links between the CIs and the CCP can be 
seen in the broader system of governance in which they operate.  Like 
Chinese universities, the CIs operate under the higher education law that 
is designed to serve the Chinese Communist Party by promoting “socialist 
material and spiritual civilization” and upholding the ideological ortho-
doxy of “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping 
Theory.”37  Although many Chinese academics value unbiased and inde-
pendent discussion of social issues through blogs and journal articles, they 
are also obliged to work within constraints on the freedom of expression 
and access to information that would not be acceptable in a democratic 
society, while students are subjected to political indoctrination through 
“patriotic education” and “national defense education,” and to counseling 
for harboring “radical thoughts.”38
To ensure that higher education institutions adhere to such direc-
tives, they are put under the dual leadership of an academic chancellor 
and a CCP president, who acts much like a political commissar.  The Han-
ban is also a part of this system of higher education, being affiliated with 
the Ministry of Education.  It thus operates through the same type of dual 
governance structure, with its Chief Executive, Mme Xu Lin (who has 
36“Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes.” Available online at the Hanban 
website, http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).
37Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
jiaoyufa” (Higher Education Law of the PRC), January 1, 1999, http://www.moe.edu.cn/
publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_619/200407/1311.html (accessed February 21, 
2013).
38“University Calls ‘Radical Students’ for a Quiet Word,” South China Morning Post, March 
26, 2011, 4.
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a rank equivalent to a deputy minister in the State Council—the highest 
executive arm of the Chinese government—and developed her career in 
the Ministry of Education), working alongside a deputy who is the CCP 
secretary to the organization.39  Three of the sixteen members of the Han-
ban’s governing Council are also members of the CCP Central Commit-
tee.40  The most high-ranking of these is the Hanban Director, Mme Liu 
Yandong, a member of the Politburo since 2007.  Liu has worked her way 
to the top through Party and state bureaucracies involved in propaganda 
work, including a stint as head of the United Front Department from 2002 
to 2003, an organization that has its origins in the Leninist united front 
strategy adopted by the CCP in the early 1920s to overcome political op-
position by winning over waverers, while isolating and undermining those 
categorized as irredeemable enemies.  Since then she has continued this 
line of work as vice chairperson and a member of the group that repre-
sents the CCP in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), a chamber that is presented as resembling an advisory upper 
house in which several other political parties are allowed representation in 
a “patriotic united front” under the leadership of the CCP.41
Another member of the Hanban Council whose presence sheds some 
light on the political mission of the CIs is Hu Zhanfan.  A member of the 
CCP since 1975 and President of China Central Television (CCTV) since 
2011, Hu was also deputy director of the State Administration of Radio 
Film and Television from 2001 to 2011, which acts as the main censor 
of the media.  He became particularly controversial in China when, soon 
after his appointment to CCTV, he explained to the China National Media 
39“Guanyu women–Lingdao jianli” (About Us—Leaders’ Concise Histories), Hanban web-
site, http://www.hanban.edu.cn/hb/node_38260.htm (accessed February 21, 2013).
40This information about careers of the membership of the Council of the CI Headquarters 
was accessed online at <http://www.chinese.cn/conference11/node 37099.ht> on May 24, 
2012.  When access was attempted again on December 17, 2012, the web page had been 
removed.
41The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
website, http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2012/07/03/ARTI1341301557187103.shtml (ac-
cessed October 20, 2014).
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Association that “the first social responsibility and professional ethic of 
media staff should be understanding their role clearly as a good mouth-
piece” and told journalists that they were fooling themselves if they 
thought they were independent professionals rather than “propaganda 
workers.”  He warned that those who did not understand this concept 
“would not go far.” Chinese netizens reacted by comparing Hu to Joseph 
Goebbels.42  Yet Hu was doing no more than echoing a speech given by Li 
Changchun to the All-China Journalists Association in October that year, 
in which Li explained that “the journalistic front must have a high sense 
of political responsibility and historical mission, deeply studying, propa-
gating and implementing the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 17th Central 
Committee [of the CCP] in order to promote the great advancement and 
flourishing of socialist culture.”43
Given the high priority attached to isolating and annexing the island 
of Taiwan in Chinese foreign policy, the presence of Zhou Mingwei on 
the Hanban Council is also worth noting.  This is because Zhou was a 
deputy director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Council (the highest state or-
ganization for the implementation of China’s Taiwan policy) and became 
something of a minor celebrity in diplomatic circles when he was dis-
patched to Washington in 2001 to lobby against arms sales to Taipei and 
any departure from the “one China principle” following the first transfer 
of power in Taiwan’s 2001 presidential election.44  In common with these 
high-profile figures, it is safe to say that all of the members of the Hanban 
management team have developed their careers in the Party and state bu-
reaucracies involved in United Front and propaganda work.
42“Quote of the Day: Hu Zhanfan’s Propaganda Workers,” The Fragrant Harbour (blog), 
December 6, 2011, http://thefragrantharbour.blogspot.com/2011/12/quote-of-day-hu 
-zhanfans-propaganda.html.
43Dinah Gardner, “China Media Boss Says Propaganda Good, Journalism Bad,” Uncut: 
Free Speech on the Frontline, December 6, 2011, http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/tag/
hu-zhanfan/.
44Joshua Cooper Ramo, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Message,” Time, March 4, 2001, http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,101335,00.html.
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Risks from the Clash of Missions
The above evidence shows that it is misleading to compare the CIs to 
cultural diplomacy organizations in democratic societies because they are 
located on campuses and serve the interests of a particular political party. 
Moreover, the CCP’s ideological and legal position that it is legitimate to 
maintain power by suppressing civil and political liberties and the free-
dom of thought and expression is wholly incompatible with the protec-
tion and promotion of democracy that is an important part of the mission 
of the classical model of the university.  This makes it important to look 
more carefully at the risks involved in hosting CIs, rather than assume that 
they can be managed in the same way as other academic joint programs, 
as proposed by McCord.  The most obvious of these risks are listed below.
1. Employment Policy: The Hanban’s policy is in breach of the kind of 
employment rights found in most democratic societies today, because 
it discriminates on grounds of age, disability, religious and political 
belief.  Until recently its own website explicitly stated that prospec-
tive teachers would only be considered if they were “Aged between 22 
to 60, physical and mental healthy (sic), no record of participation in 
Falun Gong and other illegal organizations and no criminal record.”45 
It is this discrimination that moved a teacher posted to the CI at Mc-
Master University in Canada to file an application for asylum, on the 
grounds that she found herself in the position of either having to hide 
her membership of Falun Gong in order to work at the university, or 
incriminate herself by refusing to sign.  Although the proscription 
of Falun Gong followers has now been removed from the Hanban 
website, the catch-all phrase of insisting on “no criminal record” is 
broad enough in the Chinese context to include not only Falun Gong 
adherents but also advocates of democracy and human rights.  That 
45“Overseas Volunteer Chinese Teacher Program,” Article 3rd.  Available at Hanban website, 
http://www.chinese.cn/hanban_en/node_9806.htm (accessed February 13, 2012).
Confucius Institutes and the University
December 2014 63 
concerned academics have condemned such a practice as “unethical 
and illegal in the free world” draws attention to the way in which the 
presence of a CI on campus poses a risk both to individuals and to the 
reputation of the university as a whole.46
2. Propaganda: A degree of risk to the reputation of the university for 
academic integrity arises from the way in which CIs organize activities 
that are designed to promote an overly positive view of China, while not 
allowing critical discussion of controversial topics such as the status of 
Tibet and Taiwan, or of events such as the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. 
When such events are touched on, they are presented by academics 
from China who have a record of promoting CCP policy.  When the 
CI at Sydney University organized a public lecture on Tibetan history 
by an academic from the Chinese Center for Tibetan Studies in August 
2012, for example, local pro-Tibet groups dismissed the Center as “a 
very good outlet for Chinese propaganda.”47  Their concerns arose be-
cause the academic concerned, Zhang Yun, has openly declared on a 
number of other occsions that he is on a mission to explain that Tibet 
has always been governed by China and was rescued by the CCP from 
a scheme by the Dalai Lama to restore “a society of feudal serfdom 
even darker and more backward than medieval Europe . . . a dictator-
ship of monks and aristocrats.”  He has also argued that the recent 
wave of Tibetan self-immolations was linked to “overseas plots.”48
46Matthew Robertson, “At US Universities, Confucius Institutes Import Discrmination,” 
Epoch Times, August 24, 2011, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/at-us 
-universities-confucius-institutes-import-discrimination-60714.html.
47Rowan Callick, “Uni Group ‘Propaganda’ Reshapes Lama Tale,” The Australian, August 
13, 2012.
48Zhang Yun’s role in the propaganda response to the Tibetan uprising in 2008 has been 
covered in Warren W. Smith, Tibet’s Last Stand? The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and 
China’s Response (Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 111.  For more on Zhang’s 
views see “Self-Immolations in Tibetan Area Linked to Overseas Plots,” Xinhuanet, 
December 6, 2011.  Online at China.org: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-12/06/
content_24087725.htm (accessed February 21, 2013); “Tibetan Feudal Serfdom under 
Theocracy and Western European Serfdom in the Middle Ages,” China Daily, January 11, 
2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/18/content_6627418.htm; “Chinese 
Tibet Scholars Share Expertise with Chicago Students,” People’s Daily, May 28, 2012, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/203691/7827823.html.
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3. Confidence of Students: The links between the CIs and the CCP can 
also have a negative impact on the confidence students have in the 
academic integrity of their institution.  When the London School of 
Economics (LSE) opened a Confucius Institute for Business (London) 
(CIBL) in October 2006, for example, the local student union news- 
paper published a photograph on its front page showing the then LSE 
Director, Howard Davies, unveiling a plaque and statue of Confucius 
with Jia Qinglin, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, 
under the title, “China and LSE: hand-in-hand?” The accompanying re-
port asked why the School was hosting a figure under investigation by 
a Spanish court for committing genocide and crimes against humanity 
due to his leading role in the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners.49 
Chinese students revealed to the author that they were disappointed to 
arrive at a foreign university only to discover that their own govern-
ment had established an organization on campus that made it feel as 
though they were still under the kind of surveillance that they had to 
live with in China.  In the words of one such student, “The Confucius 
Institute, to me, functions like the closed circulation (sic) television 
and has the potential to scare away my critical thinking by constantly 
reminding me: we are watching you and behave yourself.”50  The onus 
should be on host universities to find out how representative such 
views might be, paying special attention to vulnerable groups, such as 
advocates of political reform in China, Tibetans and Uighurs, followers 
of Falun Gong, advocates of Taiwanese independence and democracy 
advocates from Hong Kong, and whether such views are shared by 
local students.
49“China and LSE: Hand-in-Hand?” The Beaver, November 14, 2006, 1.
50This quote is from an email dated May 25, 2012 from a Chinese student at the LSE who 
has not been identified due to considerations of privacy and safety.  This is one of many 
emails that the author of this article received after the Sunday Times reported that he had 
cited the CI as being in an ethical dilemma during the debate at the LSE on how to de-
velop an ethics code that could avoid a repeat of the scandal that shook the school when 
its links with the Colonel Gaddafi regime became the focus of media attention during the 
Libyan revolution of 2011.  See “Beijing Cash Threatens to Plunge LSE into New Dona-
tions Scandal,” The Sunday Times, May 20, 2012.
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4. Distortion of the Academic Agenda: Another kind of risk posed to the 
work of universities concerns the longer-term development of Sinology 
and Chinese Studies as a discipline and a profession.  Of particular 
concern to Sinologists is the way in which the Hanban insists that 
CIs can only use the standardized form of Putonghua Chinese and the 
simplified form of characters developed in the PRC.  Spokespersons 
for the Chinese government are certainly not shy about seeing the pro-
motion of the Chinese language as a tool to become a “strong state” 
(qiang guo) when talking to a domestic audience.51  Academics in 
Chinese Studies outside China are thus concerned that the conditions 
laid down by the Hanban deny students the opportunity to learn dia-
lects such as Cantonese and the full-form, traditional characters used in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and favored by many overseas Chinese communi-
ties beyond the direct control of the CCP.52  As Michael Churchman, a 
research student at ANU, explains, the Hanban directive that prevents 
foreigners from writing certain kinds of Chinese characters is based on 
the principle of encouraging them to extend their knowledge of China 
in ways that are only acceptable to Beijing, which is as political as the 
directive “You must not discuss the Dalai Lama.”53
5. Impact on Existing Academic Organizations: Fears are thus growing 
that a generation of China scholars may be created who will only feel 
comfortable working with a simplified version of China and will have 
difficulty dealing with historical texts or using media outlets in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan that are critical of the CCP.  This is exacerbated by a 
51See for example the article on the views of the relationship between language and great 
power status professed by Li Yuming (李宇明), head of the bureau for managing writ-
ten cultural information at the Ministry of Information, in the leading CCP newspaper 
for intellectuals, Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily 2004).  Li Yuming, “Qiang 
guo de yuyan yu yuyan qiangguo” (The language of the strong state and the linguistic 
strong state), Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), July 28, 2004, http://www.gmw 
.cn/01gmrb/2004-07/28/content_65824.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).
52Starr, “Chinese Language Education in Europe.”
53Michael Churchman, “Confucius Institutes and Controlling Chinese Languages,” China 
Heritage Quarterly, no. 26 (June 2011), http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/articles 
.php?searchterm=026_confucius.inc&issue=026.
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broader concern about the long-term impact of CIs on Sinological studies, 
as they allow universities and governments to scale down funding for 
existing centers of expertise and specialist libraries.  Using teachers 
supplied by the Hanban might also deny job opportunities to scholars 
trained outside China, a concern that has been expressed by towering 
academic figures like Yu Yingshi, Emeritus Professor of East Asian 
Studies and History at Princeton University.54  Prof Goran Malmqvist, 
Professor of Sinology at Stockholm University and a member of the 
Swedish Academy, has gone so far as to describe the advent of the CIs 
as amounting to another kind of Cultural Revolution because they have 
little relationship to real sinology and are allowing universities to wind 
down their support for established centers.55
6. Marginalization of Academics: Prof Yu has also warned that the CIs 
risk creating divisions in the scholarly community as academics who 
refuse to cooperate are marginalized from the development of Chinese 
studies in their own university, while their colleagues who do cooper-
ate enjoy access to additional funds, contacts and the making of deci-
sions that shape the relationship of their institution with China.  In this 
situation, even the most well established experts in Chinese studies can 
find themselves isolated and at odds with their colleagues when they 
raise concerns.  The worst-case scenario is when academics no longer 
feel able to work in a university that does not respect their professional 
standards, suffering ostracization, exclusion from the university and 
denial of promotion.  At least one academic has described in personal 
correspondence with the author how he/she had to leave a senior post 
on a Chinese program at a university in the United States after a CI was 
54Yu Yingshi and Bei Ming, “Kongzi xueyuan ji qi yingxiang—zhuanfang Yu Yingshi” 
(The Confucius Institutes and their influence – An exclusive interview with Yu Yingshi), 
Zonglanzhongguo (China in Perspective), March 22, 2012, http://www.chinainperspec-
tive.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=15064.
55Ma Ruiran (馬悅然) (Goran Malmqvist), “Ma Ruiran: Sidegeermo daxue zhongwenxi de 
wenhua da geming” (Goran Malmqvist: The Cultural Revolution in the Chinese depart-
ment of Stockholm University”), Ming Bao Monthly, February 28, 2012, www.21ccom 
.net/articles/sdbb/2012/0228/54568.html (accessed February 21, 2013).
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sprung on the faculty without warning, following secret negotiations 
conducted by the president of the university.  Conditions became un-
bearable when the program was starved of funds until it had to accept 
“suggestions” from the CI on how to carry out its work.56  New mem-
bers of the teaching profession are in an even more vulnerable situa-
tion, especially if they have to commit themselves to working with a 
CI that is highlighted in job advertisements as a flagship project of the 
university.
7. Self-Censorship: One of the most detrimental impacts of the threat of 
marginalization on the mission of the classical model of the university 
is that it can lead to self-censorship.  Even McCord accepts that this is 
a legitimate concern, although he hopes it will self-correct if CIs be-
come too overbearing.57  Perry Link is less optimistic, seeing creeping 
self-censorship as the major threat posed by the CIs because it strikes 
at the heart of academic freedom.58  Looking ahead, however, what aca-
demics see as measures to prevent the emergence of self-censorship are 
seen as obstacles to be overcome by the Hanban and the CIs in the ex-
pansion of their work into the core activities of the university through a 
kind of mission creep.
Mission Creep
As concern has grown over the above risks, the Hanban has re-
sponded by seeking ways to allow the CIs to broaden out their work be-
yond the teaching of language and traditional culture by making greater 
efforts to penetrate the core activities of universities.  The result is a kind 
of mission creep.  As early as April 2007 it was evident that the remit of 
56Email to the author, June 18, 2012.
57McCord, “Confucius Institute: Hardly a Threat.”
58Perry Link, in his contribution to “The Debate Over Confucius Institutes,” ChinaFile, 
June 23, 2014, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes 
(consulted October 3, 2014).
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the CIs could expand beyond language and culture teaching, when Japan’s 
Waseda University opened a CI in partnership with Peking University that 
includes a program to assist the research activities of graduate students 
studying in China.  The Confucius Business Institute (London) at the LSE 
has expanded its remit in a different way by getting indirectly involved 
with new academic programs related to China through the provision of 
language teaching for new double degrees, such as an MSc in Interna-
tional Affairs with Peking University and an MSc in Global Media with 
Shanghai’s Fudan University.59  It also organizes discussions on topics 
such as China’s financial system, its knowledge economy, its economic 
situation and the “China model,” sometimes led by personnel linked to the 
Chinese embassy.  It holds an economic forum for PhD candidates, hosts 
visiting professors from China and organizes talks by influential Chinese 
speakers.  Such activities may be of interest to staff, students and the 
public, but they impinge on the core work of the university itself, which 
should be the property of those academic staff who have been through the 
rigor of the relevant procedures to gain employment and promotion in the 
profession.  This expanding mission is particularly significant because the 
LSE was cited in 2009 by Hartig as a positive example of an institution 
hosting a CI that confined itself to the teaching of Chinese language for 
business.
It appears that the annual Hanban conference in December 2012 was 
a turning point in this movement towards overcoming the limits being 
imposed by host institutions.  It was on that occasion that the CIs were 
congratulated on having made progress in moving into a new stage of 
“indigenization” (bentuhua) that goes beyond the teaching of language 
and traditional culture, but were also described as being marginalized by 
host institutions due to political concerns.60  A number of strategies were 
thus recommended to break down the barriers preventing the “integration” 
59LSE News and Views, October 30, 2006.
60“Kongzi xueyuan.  Zaoyu chengzhang de fannao” (Confucius Institutes hitting difficulties 
in their growth), Xinhuanet, December 19, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/ 
2012-12/19/d_124114541.htm (accessed February 13, 2013).
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(rongru 融入) of the CIs into the mainstream activities of universities, 
schools and communities.  Central to these strategies is the launching of 
the research-focused “Confucius China Studies Program” (孔子新漢學
計畫), which is more accurately rendered into English as the “New Con-
fucius Sinology Plan.”  This involves cooperation between CIs and host 
institutions on the projects of doctoral students, youth leadership, study 
trips for scholars to “understand China,” international conferences and as-
sistance for publishing research.
It was also explained at the conference that this strategy was to be 
accompanied by greater efforts to penetrate the broader academic sys-
tem of the host country by holding Chinese classes in junior and middle 
schools and by designing the local curriculum.  As the conference noted, 
the aspiration of over 40 countries to introduce Chinese into their national 
education systems presented a good opportunity to achieve this.  The 
work of the CI at Kentucky State University was held up as an example, 
having supplied Chinese teachers and a curriculum for six schools.  Build-
ing on such successes would require cultivating a “brigade” (duiwu 隊伍) 
of expert teachers, who could overcome the constraints on the penetration 
of host systems that arise from the current practice of hiring CI teachers 
on short term contracts and relying on ethnic Chinese volunteers, many of 
whom may speak English but do not even know the language of the coun-
try to which they are sent.  According to Xu Lin, Hanban Chief Executive, 
this may involve the training of native teachers and efforts to indigenize 
teaching materials by making CIs responsible for teacher training in local 
high schools, a development that is already under way in Iowa.61
It is not hard to see how the offer of using CIs to teach school chil-
dren may be attractive for financially stretched education authorities 
facing a growing demand for Chinese language instruction.  Public con-
troversy has already arisen, however, over issues such as the treatment of 
historical events in the teaching materials provided for schools under the 
auspices of the Hanban.  When Hartig concluded that the materials used 
61Ibid.
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by the CIs for language teaching do not amount to propaganda, he could 
not have been aware of the scandal that erupted in June 2012 when it was 
revealed that the Hanban was providing teaching materials for school 
children on its own website which described the Korean War as “The War 
to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea,” which included computer ani-
mations that demonized the United States forces and portrayed the Chi-
nese soldiers as heroes.62  It may be an indication of the limited influence 
on the Hanban of those academics in China who do question the CCP pro-
paganda interpretation of the Korean War (which has been condemned by 
liberal historians for failing to acknowledge that it was North Korea that 
attacked South Korea in 1950).  When judging whether political change 
inside China is likely to make the operations of organizations like the 
Hanban more similar to those of academic organizations in democratic 
societies, it is also worth noting that even the minor successes of histori-
ans in 2010 in having the state-run media acknowledge that the war was 
started by Stalin and Kim Jong-il have since then been rolled back.63
While older students might be able to see through such attempts at 
indoctrination, their impact on younger children may have less certain 
long-term consequences.  From the perspective of those pursuing China’s 
foreign policy goals, some satisfaction can be taken from evidence that 
indicates that the CIs are already inculcating more positive views among 
American children towards China and its government.  According to one 
62This lesson was removed from the teaching materials available on the Confucius Institute 
Online website the day after the author of this article drew it to the attention of a col-
league in a closed online discussion group for academics working on Chinese politics. 
The lesson can still be viewed at http://shanghaiist.com/2012/10/16/watch_what_the 
_confucius_institute.php (accessed February 11, 2013).  Other Confucius Institute On-
line materials for teaching Chinese history can still be viewed at http://kid.chinese.cn/
en/node_1019_5.htm (accessed February 11, 2013).  A sense of the public controversy 
sparked by this issue can be gained from the ABC television news report available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Parenting/mandarin-language-classes-mixed-reaction-chinese 
-institutes-motives/story?id=17485209 (accessed February 11, 2013).
63“‘Junshi guangjiao’ Zhongguo guanmei shouci chengren shi Sidalin he Jin Richeng he-
mou fadongle Chaoxian zhanzheng” (“Military Corner”: China’s official media recognize 
for the first time that Stalin and Kim Il-song started the Korean War), Junshi guangjiao, 
June 25, 2010, http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-worldlook-361572-1.shtml.
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survey taken of students who had attended CI language classes at Bryant 
University and the University of Massachusetts, Boston, the vocabulary 
used to describe China had moved away from terms such as “boring, 
alien, complex, foot-binding and communism” in favor of “beautiful, 
civilized, intricate, advanced, amazing, smart, interesting, respect, cool 
idioms, original stories, fun, hard work, increasing population.”  The pro-
portion of those with “very positive” views of China had moved from 33 
percent up to 52 percent, and those with “negative” or “slightly negative” 
views of the Chinese government had moved down from 28 per cent to 
just 3 per cent.64
While nobody should argue that schools should promote a negative 
view of China, it is important to ask whether it is right for universities to 
allow their authority and facilities to be harnessed to what looks like a 
propaganda campaign in the schools.  Ultimately, it is part of the mission 
of the university in a democratic society to ensure that this does not hap-
pen.  Moreover, when universities allow the activities of CIs to appear on 
their websites and to use their logos, they provide them with a degree of 
legitimacy in the eyes of students and the public who expect such brands 
to guarantee high standards of academic integrity.
The responsibility to protect this reputation for the entire higher 
education sector is especially important for the most prestigious and 
well-resourced universities, since there is growing evidence that smaller 
universities are more likely to be put under pressure by the Hanban.  The 
University of Lyon is an example, having to close its CI in September 
2013 because, in the words of its director, the Hanban hardened its strat-
64Wu Xiaoping, “Zhongguo xingxiang de tisheng: lai zi Kongzi xueyuan jiaoxue de qishi” 
(Raising China’s image: Lessons from teaching at the CIs), Waijiao pinglun (Foreign Af-
fairs Review), no. 1 (2011): 94.
  Wu’s statistics are from a survey of opinion conducted at the University of Massachusetts, 
Boston, and Bryant University, of students aged 12-18 who have attended Chinese classes 
at the CIs.  It is particularly interesting that these CI programs are funded by the Startup 
program, an initiative started by the George W. Bush administration in 2006 as part of 
the National Security Language Initiative to increase national capacity in languages such 
as Chinese, Russian and Arabic, which has contracted Chinese teaching out to Confucius 
Institutes at various universities.
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egy to the extent that “it seemed that our institutional and intellectual in-
dependence became unacceptable to Beijing.”65  The problem began when 
a new director had arrived with instructions from Beijing to question the 
content of courses and insist on a deeper integration of the institute into 
the University, including working with research centers and participat-
ing in teaching on degree programs.  When the university resisted, Xu 
Lin demanded the resignation of the Chair of the institute’s board and 
announced, without warning, the suspension of the Hanban’s annual fi-
nancial subsidy.  The inflexible attitude of the Hanban prevented any pos-
sibility of reaching a compromise.
This was followed by an even more dramatic example of mission 
creep, when Portugal’s Minho University was forced to censor the confer-
ence materials it had produced for the biennial European Association of 
Chinese Studies (EACS) conference, which it co-hosted in July 2014 with 
Coimbra University.  The Hanban’s Confucius China Studies Program had 
provided Euros 28,040 to the conference via Minho’s CI, which included 
Euros 7,000 to pay for the conference abstracts.66  When the participants 
received these materials at the opening ceremony at Coimbra, four pages 
of the abstracts had been removed and three pages from the program, 
torn out by Hanban staff apparently because they contained information 
regarding Taiwan’s Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation (CCKF) and a book 
exhibition by the Taiwan National Central Library.  According to EACS 
President, Roger Greatrex, the order to remove the pages had been issued 
by Xu Lin, who was visiting Portugal at the time.67  Greatrex concluded 
his report on the incident by proclaiming that “censorship of conference 
materials cannot and will never be tolerated by the EACS.”  That the Han-
65An English version of Gregory B. Lee’s account can be found at “The Debate over Con- 
fucius Institutes, Part II,” Chinafile, January 7, 2014, http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/ 
debate-over-confucius-institutes-part-ii.
66“Report: The Deletion of Pages from EACS Conference Materials in Braga (July 2014),” 
EACS website, August 1, 2014, http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/432-test.
67“Letter of Protest at Interference in EACS Conference in Portugal, July 2014,” EACS, 
http://www.chinesestudies.eu/index.php/433-letter-of-protest-at-interference-in-eacs 
-conference-in-portugal-july-2014.
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ban was able to perpetrate such an act of censorship by working through 
a relatively minor university, however, raises a number of questions over 
whether it is possible to manage the CIs within an acceptable margin of 
risk, especially when their status is given credibility through hosting by 
more prestigious and better-endowed universities.
Can the CIs Be Managed?
Despite the risks listed above, there has been only minimal discus-
sion of whether closer institutional links with China can be managed 
within limits that are compatible with the mission of the university (as 
defined in Bell’s classical model) over the medium to long term.  One 
advantage of seeing these problems as generated by a broader process of 
global change that is forcing two different missions for higher education 
to be more closely aligned is to minimize the tendency to call into ques-
tion the motives of the individuals who are involved on the different sides 
of the debate.  In the first place, teachers who are sent by the Hanban to 
work at the CIs should not be blamed for working within a framework 
that is established by China’s laws and political leaders.  The motives of 
those who argue that the CIs are a welcome source of support for over-
stretched universities to help meet the growing demands of students and 
businesses should also be respected.  Conversely, individuals should feel 
free to express their concerns over the risks that arise from the presence 
of CIs on campus without being stereotyped by spokespersons for the 
Chinese government as being opposed to academic engagement and as 
being “irresponsible” and blinded by “cold war thinking.”68  It is ironic 
when Chinese academics who see CIs as instruments for projecting “soft 
68See, for example, the speech delivered by China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu 
Xiaoming, to the Joint Conference of European Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, held 
in Edinburgh, published by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United 
Kingdom, “Speech by Amb.  Liu Xiaoming at the Opening Session of the Conference 
of European Confucius Institutes,” June 6, 2012, http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/ 
eng/EmbassyNews/t938943.htm (accessed February 13, 2012).
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power” accuse those who question their location on university campuses 
of stirring up unnecessary fears of a “cultural invasion” based on a “China 
threat theory.”69
The best way to avoid such growing divisions in the academic com-
munity is to rebuild consensus on the ethical values that define the mis-
sion of the university.  Most universities do already profess to abide by 
ethical standards that are drawn from the classical model, such as a com-
mitment to oppose discrimination and to respect and promote diversity, 
collegiality and the protection and promotion of academic freedom.70 
However, many academics are unaware that they can refer back to little-
read mission statements and codes of conduct when they come under pres-
sure.  Moreover, the increasing centralization of structures of university 
governance tends not to be accompanied by the building of sufficiently 
robust measures to ensure that ethical standards are implemented, as staff 
have to grapple with the complex challenges of working in a globalized 
system.71  As is shown by the damage caused to the reputation of the LSE 
69Wang, “Guanyu Zhongguo wenhua dui wai chuanbo,” 80; Liu et al., “Shijie qita yuyan 
wenhua tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi,” 122; Zhou, “Cong guoji xingxiang shijiao kan 
kongzi xueyuan,” 162.
70A random sample of mission statements and ethics codes of research universities—both 
with and without a CI—reveals that all claim to put a high value on intellectual freedom, 
non-discrimination and allowing individuals to develop their potential to serve society. 
See, for example, Harvard and Cambridge universities (which do not host a CI) at 
<http://www.harvard.edu/faqs/mission-statement and http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/univ/ 
mission.html>; and the LSE and Maryland (which do host a CI) at <http://www2.lse 
.ac.uk/intranet/staff/humanResources/joiningLSE/prospectiveStaff/institutionalvalues 
.pdf> and <http://www.responsibleconduct.umd.edu/brochure.pdf> (all accessed Febru-
ary 17, 2013).
71One of the main recommendations of the external inquiry carried into the links between 
the LSE and the Gaddafi regime, that were brought to public attention by the 2011 revo-
lution in Libya, was to address such shortcomings by requiring the institution to draw up 
an ethics code and create an ethics committee.  Lord Justice Woolf, The Woolf Inquiry: 
An Inquiry into the LSE’s Links with Libya and Lessons to be Learned (London: House 
of Lords, 2011), 142.  Available online: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/woolf/
home.aspx.  After prolonged internal discussion, an ethics code was drawn up which 
commits the School to the protection of intellectual freedom, to respecting equality and 
diversity and which states that “in its dealings with states, organisations, and individuals, 
the School should not enter into any relationship that compromises, or could reasonably 
be perceived to compromise, its values, or that makes it complicit in illegal activity or the 
suppression of human rights.”  London School of Economics and Political Science, “The 
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and the careers of several of its academics and managers following media 
revelations about its links with the regime of Colonel Gaddafi during the 
Libyan revolution in 2011, an awareness of ethical standards in not just an 
issue of moral concern.  It also has a direct bearing on the material inter-
ests of a university and its staff.  When partnerships and external sources 
of funding are established, this makes it important to assess the way in 
which the nature and stability of a foreign regime might impact such risks 
to reputations and careers.  Repression inside China, growing instability 
in Hong Kong and the risks of a crisis engendered by a downturn in rela-
tions with Taiwan are only a few of the more obvious dynamics that could 
present a Libya-type situation for hosts of CIs.
Even those with a relatively pragmatic outlook should be aware that 
the scale, speed, resources and strategic thinking of the Hanban make it 
important to ensure that the risks involved in hosting a CI are properly 
considered.  This means developing clear and robust ethical codes and 
ensuring that concerned university faculty are fully aware of their ex-
istence and are involved in their implementation.  This might help to 
avoid the embarrassment of appearing to be ill-informed about the risks 
involved in key decisions, as when the Assistant Vice-President in charge 
of Public and Government Relations at McMaster University had to ex-
plain to the Falun Gong newspaper, Epoch Times, that her institution was 
unaware that employees of the CI are required to sign a contract that bans 
association with the Falun Gong.72  By February 2013, McMaster had 
become so concerned about this situation that it decided to not renew its 
contract for a CI with the Hanban.73
Ethics Code” (2012).  Online: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/intranet/LSEServices/policies/pdfs/
school/ethCod.pdf (accessed Feburary 17, 2013).  It remains to be seen how this will be 
implemented.
72“Former McMaster Confucius Institute Teacher Seeks Asylum in Canada,” Epoch Times, 
August 31, 2011, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/canada/former-mcmaster-confucius 
-institute-teacher-seeks-asylum-in-canada-60805.html (accessed February 21, 2013).
73“McMaster Closing Confucius Institute over Hiring Issues,” Globe and Mail, February 
7, 2013, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing 
-confucius-institute-over-hiring-issues/article8372894/ (accessed February 13, 2013).
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Such episodes have begun to multiply as faculty have felt the need 
to mobilize against the hosting of CIs due to a lack of consultation.  One 
of the most prominent campaigns has been at the University of Chicago, 
where 170 members of the faculty have signed a petition opposing what 
they decried as an “academically and politically ambiguous initiative” 
that was established without the consent of the faculty or the Senate. 
Similarly, in 2007, academics at the University of Pennsylvania mobilized 
against proposals to establish a CI when its China experts expressed con-
cerns that they were being bypassed by an administration that was look-
ing for a way to “shoehorn” Chinese students in the university’s graduate 
programs.74
As these concerns have spread across the sector, teaching unions 
have also taken action, with the American Association of University 
Professors passing a resolution in June 2013 that calls for universities to 
either shut down their CIs or renegotiate their contracts to ensure that they 
have control over academic matters.  This action was echoed by the Ca-
nadian Association of University Teachers in December that year.  There 
is also growing concern at the school-level, with the Toronto School 
Board deciding to terminate its agreement for the CIs to provide elemen-
tary school Chinese teaching in the 2014-15 academic year.  It is in this 
context of growing opposition that some of the leading universities have 
found a way out by simply not renewing their contracts with the Hanban 
on expiry, led by Chicago and Pennsylvania in 2014.
Despite this gradual turning of the tide against the CIs, however, 
their number continues to grow, especially in the developing world.  This 
means that the ethical concerns that define the classical model of the uni-
versity need to be made more systematically and transparently than has 
been the case so far.  Yet it is also important not to take pragmatic argu-
ments at face value.  Headline figures of financial donations made by the 
Hanban make it easy to assume that host institutions make a net gain, for 
74Daniel Golden, “China Says No Talking Tibet as Confucius Funds US Universities,” 
Bloomberg, November 1, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-01/china-says 
-no-talking-tibet-as-confucius-funds-u-s-universities.html (accessed February 13, 2013).
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example.  Yet if the costs of providing matching funds, accommodation 
and administrative support are factored into the balance sheet, there may 
well be more efficient ways to use scarce resources than the CI model 
can provide.  The cost to the university of employing its own language 
teachers might be offset by advantages that can accrue from the in-house 
training of staff who are free from political constraints and motives and 
who are more familiar with the teaching methods used in the host country 
than the volunteers selected by the Hanban.  In fact, one of the complaints 
made about the CIs in the discussion inside China is that the teachers se-
lected by the Hanban are often poorly trained.75  Moreover, if the Chinese 
government is genuinely interested in promoting teaching about China, it 
might be better for it to supply funds to support the provision and train-
ing of personnel by universities with no political strings attached.  Rather 
than denying job opportunities to Chinese nationals, this would open the 
door to individuals who might be excluded under the Hanban system on 
political, religious or health grounds.
It may turn out that after submitting the decision to host a CI is sub-
mitted to a rigorous and transparent process of scrutiny, some universities 
will still decide that it is appropriate to go ahead with the project.  If so, 
then the onus is on those who advocate such a position to publicly ex-
plain how hosting an organization that is linked so closely to the Chinese 
political regime is compatible with the public position of their university 
on defending and promoting values such as the pursuit of academic and 
intellectual freedom and respect for religious and political diversity.  An-
other alternative is to remove such classical values from the mission of 
the university.  If the university is understood to be an institution that both 
reflects and shapes the values of the society in which it is embedded, 
however, such a departure would have repercussions that go well beyond 
the fate of higher education and therefore should not be allowed to happen 
by default.
75Liu et al., “Shijie qita yuyan wenhua tuiguang jigou fazhan moshi,” 120; Ding and Wei, 
“Kongzi xueyuan: Zhongguo de ruan shili jianshe de youxiao pingtai,” 124.
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